Congress questions Homeland Security's approach to nuclear detection

Two key nuclear detection programs the Homeland Security Department administers face scrutiny as lawmakers question their value and effectiveness in detecting the most likely nuclear threats.

Comment on this article in The Forum."The danger of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon is real and present," said Sen. Joseph Lieberman, I-Conn., chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. "Between 1993 and 2006 there were 1,080 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials -- with 18 of these cases involving weapons-grade materials and another 124 involving material capable of making a so-called dirty bomb that would use conventional explosives to spread nuclear material."

But Lieberman questioned whether Homeland Security's two main acquisition programs that aim to address the threat are on track to do so. "These programs looked so promising when announced just a few years ago, but it now seems that neither is likely to live up to expectations, which does leave our nation at risk," he said.

The two programs are the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors, known as ASP, and the Cargo Automated Advanced Radiography System, or CAARS. Current monitors used at ports of entry are effective at detecting radiation, but they cannot identify the radioisotope or determine whether the material is dangerous or harmless, and so Customs and Border Protection personnel must respond to hundreds of false alarms every day.

The ASP monitors under development are supposed to eliminate that problem by detecting only potentially harmful radiation. CAARS is designed to provide complementary technology that will detect threats, such as uranium or plutonium, that could be shielded with high-density materials such as lead or tungsten.

The programs were supposed to work in tandem to scan for nuclear material all cargo arriving in the United States by air, sea and land, but ASP is behind schedule and CAARS has been modified substantially after technology development proved far more difficult than anticipated.

Earlier this week, the Government Accountability Office published a briefing it provided members of Congress that concluded the ASP program could cost more than $3 billion, about $1 billion more than DHS officials have estimated. In addition, the portals will not be deployed to cover cargo arriving by air, rail or sea -- but only shipments arriving by commercial truck.

Vayl Oxford, director of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which was created in 2005 to manage both then-fledgling programs, said they were part of the department's "layered strategy" to protect against the nuclear threat. While DHS remains committed to developing the ASP portals, which now are undergoing testing, the future of CAARS is under review, said Oxford.

In April, DNDO undertook a "course correction" and modified three CAARS contracts with Science Applications International Corp., American Science and Engineering, and L-3 to eliminate the acquisition component of the contracts and instead limit it to a demonstration, test and evaluation program, Oxford said.

"DNDO found that the technology was more difficult to implement than originally anticipated and determined that [it] should be demonstrated so that its full performance capability could be established prior to acquisition," Oxford said.

Thomas Cochran, a nuclear physicist and the senior scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said DNDO's programs were misguided. "The physics is against us when it comes to the most important material, and that is highly enriched uranium," he said.

The ASP monitors that Homeland Security is developing are not cost effective, according to Cochran, and they won't significantly increase the probability of detecting highly enriched uranium.

"For the purpose of certifying the ASPs, the Department of Homeland Security has defined 'significant increase in operational effectiveness' primarily in terms of its ability to reduce the false alarm rate, rather than in terms of its ability to increase the probability of detection of HEU," he said.

Lieberman said the committee would review the information presented at the hearing and develop recommendations for the program and present them to the next administration.