DHS fails to follow suggestions for better border security
GAO lists 39 recommendations the department has yet to implement, some more than three years old.
The Homeland Security Department has failed to follow recommendations that would have better secured the U.S. border with Canada and has spent too much on experimental programs that, among other things, test new technology, according to a Government Accountability Office report issued on Tuesday.
As of November, 39 recommendations included in 11 GAO reports on the security of the U.S.-Canadian border and issued to DHS remain open. For many of those, more than three years have passed without DHS fully implementing the recommendations, GAO reported.
Some of the older recommendations that had not been deployed included improving the screening of travelers at ports of entry; preventing illicit nuclear materials from crossing the border; reducing risks in delivering key technology for border surveillance and information sharing; and increasing information sharing and coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
GAO recommended in December 2006 that DHS incorporate into its reports on general border security information about deploying biometric and nonbiometric technology for travelers leaving the country through land point of entries and ensuring technologies nationwide are compatible with those used at ports of entry. In July 2007, GAO recommended DHS develop a schedule to deploy readers to U.S. points of entry so inspectors could scan security features embedded in the new electronic passports. None of the recommendations has been fully implemented.
"DHS does not have a transparent process to show how long it will take to implement each recommendation considering the resources, risk level and complexity of effort required," GAO reported. "Timely implementation of recommendations would help address vulnerabilities related to a variety of border security initiatives. . . . We believe that these outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented."
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which is responsible primarily for Northern border security, reported to GAO that technology is in place to identify illegal radiological and nuclear materials, contraband and fraudulent documents. The agency also said it is testing projects to better share communications and to detect low-flying aircraft and unauthorized border crossings in areas without patrols. But CBP's report does not mention when the results of the projects will be available, according to GAO, or the extent to which DHS would use the technologies, if proved successful.
"If successful, [CBP] officials report that these projects could reduce security vulnerabilities and current needs for other resources, such as existing technology, personnel, or infrastructure," GAO reported. "However, these officials also indicate that new technology must be fully tested for operational effectiveness, and delays coupled with uncertainties of success have made it difficult to balance future resource investments in new technology with current investments in existing technology. Such balance is necessary to ensure security as well as effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars."
In a written response to the GAO report, DHS said risk determines when it addresses vulnerabilities.
"Not all vulnerabilities have the same priority," said Jerald Levine, director of Homeland Security's GAO liaison office. He noted that a vulnerability that is not very likely to be exploited or would have little consequence if penetrated would be addressed after those that pose greater threats. "While all of the [GAO] recommendations previously made have merit, the department's ability to implement them will depend on many factors," he said.
DHS agreed to GAO's recommendation to provide more details in future reports to Congress, including planned actions, resource requirements and time frames for increasing the security of the Northern border.