More on DOD as a social networker
In case you can't tell, I'm fascinated by all this Web 2.0 stuff. (How's that for technical?) And, in many ways, I think the Defense Department has been at the forefront of this issue.
So in the Dec. 3 edition of Federal Computer Week, in the Buzz of the Week, we focused on "DOD as a social networker."
But I wanted to expand on it just a bit because I think it is important -- and fascinating.
After all, the theories of network-centric operations essentially mirror Web 2.0 theories. Web 2.0 is about tapping into wisdom of crowds, while the theory behind DOD's network-centric ideas are that data should be made widely available to those who need it because those people know what data will help them make decisions. The wisdom of crowds.
Of course, there has always been something of a battle in the Pentagon between the "shooters" and the techies. Many of the shooters have long been suspicious of all the gee-wiz gadgetry. That was, in part, behind the debate about whether the U.S. had enough warfighters in Iraq.
Today, "transformation," as trumpeted -- some would argue steamrolled -- by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, is almost a verboten term. Rumsfeld believed that an armed force suited with technology could make warfighters more efficient, more lethal, and more nimble. In part, he was right. The initial invasion of Iraq was very efficient. But, as is often the case with many government programs, determining real results is more difficult.
Convention wisdom today suggests that Rumsfeld's transformed DOD was very efficient about defeating Iraq's military – and that was an effective result. But that was only the beginning. The trimmed down, hyper-efficient armed force has not been able to truly win the war.
Fiascothis post
"What went wrong in Iraq (Hint: Blame the geeks)highly
Noah Shachtman
"Network-centric warfare, with its emphasis on fewer, faster-moving troops, turned out to be just about the last thing the U.S. military needed when it came time to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan," Shachtman writes. "There aren't enough troops to go out and find informants, build barricades, rebuild a sewage treatment plant, and patrol a marketplace."
blog post
The idea -- first popularized in article published ten years ago, next month -- pretty much worked as advertised, for a while. The problem is, killing people more efficiently is one of the last things you need to do a counterinsurgency situation, like the one the U.S. is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, you need to take steps to reinforce civil society, rather than blowing it apart. And that takes an understanding of the society you're trying to build.
"Irregular warfare: After smart weapons, smart soldiers,""Armies of the future: Brains, not bullets
WikinomicsAnthony Williams